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ABSTRACT
We present a new and practical framework for security ver-
ification of secure architectures. Specifically, we break the
verification task into external verification and internal verifi-
cation. External verification considers the external protocols,
i.e. interactions between users, compute servers, network
entities, etc. Meanwhile, internal verification considers the in-
teractions between hardware and software components within
each server. This verification framework is general-purpose
and can be applied to a stand-alone server, or a large-scale
distributed system. We evaluate our verification method on
the CloudMonatt and HyperWall architectures as examples.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, a number of secure architectures
have been designed to provide security functionalities (e.g.,
XOM [1], AEGIS [2], SP [3], Bastion [4], HyperWall [5],
DataSafe [6], Sanctum [7], or HDFI [8]). Ideas presented
by some of these architectures have been implemented in
commercial designs, such as ARM TrustZone [9], Intel’s
SGX [10], AMD’s SEV [11].
Once any such security architecture is designed, it is nec-
essary to check that there are no security vulnerabilities with
the design that could allow an attacker to subvert the protec-
tions. Unlike software-based solutions which may be easily
patched in the field, hardware architecture protections need to
be correct from the beginning, as it is expensive and often not
possible to update or replace them once hardware is manufac-
tured. To address this issue, designers run extensive tests and
simulations to make sure that the mechanisms work correctly.
Moreover, the designers perform informal security evaluation
which attempts to qualitatively reason about potential attacks
and show how the architectural mechanisms prevent them.
There is a lack, however, of a systematic methodology for
verification of security architectures that can be applied to
any architecture or system in a scalable manner.
A big challenge in verifying secure architectures is that
secure architectures today are usually very complex. A secure
architecture is likely to consist of different types of comput-
ing servers, and the end users. All of these are connected
by networks. Meanwhile each computing server consists of
different layers of software and hardware components. The
secure operations of the architecture include the mutual com-
munication between servers and users across the networks, as
well as interactions between hardware and software modules
inside a server. So verification of complex architectures thus
needs to be achieved by focusing on two key aspects: external
protocols and internal interactions.
Our contribution in this paper is the definition of a general-
purpose security verification framework. It has different ad-
vantages. First, it is scalable to verify complex secure archi-
tectures. The presented approach breaks down a secure archi-
tecture into smaller components for verification. Specifically,
verification of a secure architecture can be achieved effective
by focusing on external verification, of the external protocols,
and internal verification, of the internal interactions. External
protocols are used for communication between servers and
users, while internal interactions are for interactions among
components within each server. We build state machines to
verify the external protocols and internal interactions, thus
effectively achieving verification scalability.
Second, our methodology is general-purpose and can be ap-
plied to different architectures. This method is not restricted
to specific tools: designers can choose the tools they prefer to
do the verification following our methodology. This achieves
great practicality and granularity. We provide two case stud-
ies: verifying CloudMonatt [12] using a cryptographic pro-
tocol verifier ProVerif [13], and verifying HyperWall [5, 14]
using a generic model checker Murphi [15]. These case stud-
ies show that our methodology has been partly used to help
design and enhance the secure architectures.
In summary, our contributions are:
• A new, general-purpose security verification framework
for secure architectures and systems.
• A methodology to break the verification task of secure
architectures and systems into external and internal verifi-
cation, which can also be done hierarchically.
• A method to model different entities and components of
such architectures as finite state machines.
• Evaluation of the methodology on different architectures
using different tools.
We introduce our verification methodology and framework
in Section 2. Using this methodology, we verify two secure
architectures as case studies in Sections 3 and 4. We show the
verification performance in Section 5. We summarize related
work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2. VERIFICATION APPROACH
The security verification of secure architectures goes be-
yond functional verification. During design time, the threat
model is specified, which lists the potential attackers and their
capabilities. The security verification methodology needs
to model enough aspects of an architecture to capture all
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Figure 1: Different execution phases of a secure architecture.
possible behaviors of these untrusted attackers with their
capabilities, and to model their impacts on the architecture.
A secure architecture usually consists of different compo-
nents (e.g., distributed nodes, software and hardware mod-
ules). The interactions between these components and with
the external entities (e.g., remote users, networks) are very
complex. To achieve the scalability of verification, it is nec-
essary that the verification is done on each part of the archi-
tecture, rather than on the whole architecture at once. Still,
the verification of the sub-parts must compose into the verifi-
cation of the whole architecture.
In Section 2.1 we propose a method of breaking the secu-
rity verification of a system into smaller tasks, i.e., external
verification and internal verification. In Section 2.2 we de-
scribe the detailed steps to conduct each verification task.
2.1 External and Internal Verification
A system is composed of many components. Each com-
ponent is realized by one or more mechanisms. We specify
external protocols as the interaction of the system with dis-
tributed or remote components, e.g. remote users, network,
etc. There are also internal interactions which are interac-
tions between components within a physical server or local
system, e.g. processor, hypervisor, OS, etc.
The important aspect of the security-critical external proto-
cols and internal interactions is that these involve untrusted
principals or components, and hence involve potential attacks
that we need to check for. This has led us to the proposition
that the components’ interactions are the most important parts
to verify when considering the security of the system. By fo-
cusing on the component interactions we have found a natural
breakdown of the architecture into smaller parts. Verifying
smaller parts helps us avoid the state explosion problem.
The security verification of the external protocols and in-
ternal interactions provides coverage of more of the system
because the focus is on how components interface with each
other, and the details of the mechanisms are abstracted away.
A component, even a whole server, can be treated as a black-
box during external verification – and in turn security verified
during internal verification steps.
Identifying protocols and interactions. To find the dif-
ferent security-sensitive interactions, we identify different
execution phases of a secure architecture or system, as shown
in Figure 1. The middle six phases will be repeated many
times during system runtime, while the other two phases cor-
respond to system startup and shutdown. Each of the phases
will have an external protocol if there is communication with
the end user during that phase, and one or more internal in-
teractions. The internal interactions occur when there is an
event that will cause security-related state to be altered inside
the trusted components of the architecture. The different
execution stages of a hardware secure processor architecture
shown in Figure 1 can be used to help identify protocols and
interactions for security verification.
Secure composition. Given secure mechanisms or proto-
cols, A and B, which have been verified, it is very difficult to
prove that the composition of the two is also secure. We do
not tackle the problem of formal proofs of composability in
this work. We focus on providing a sound methodology for
the practical and scalable security verification of individual
external protocols and internal interactions.
However, recently Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) has
been proposed [16]. The composition theorems in PCL allow
proofs of complex protocols to be built up from proofs of
their constituent sub-protocols. It may be possible to build
on such existing work as PCL to check the composition of
the protocols and interactions which we verify.
2.2 Security Verification Framework
To verify a system’s protocols and operations, we first build
models for the system, and identify the trusted and untrusted
subjects in the system. We specify the verification goals
and invariants based on the system’s functionality. Then we
implement the models and test through the system models.
If an invariant fails in some cases, a vulnerability has been
found and the design needs to be updated.
2.2.1 Modeling System
Specifying essential components. A designer has to enu-
merate the components or principals involved. For the ex-
ternal protocol, we treat a physical server as one compo-
nent. The network component, customers, cloud provider,
and (if needed) trusted third party are also explicitly included
for the benefit of the external protocols which involve the
remote customer connecting via a communication path to
the server. For the internal interactions, we consider the
hardware components (e.g., microprocessor, memory chips,
co-processors) and software components (e.g., applications,
hypervisor, OSes). Among the protocol or interaction partic-
ipants, there are untrusted components or principals, which
could be sources of potential attacks. The untrusted com-
ponents or principals are the potential attackers and their
capabilities need to be checked.
Symbolic modeling. We adopted the symbolic modeling
method [17], where the cryptographic primitives are rep-
resented by function symbols and perfect cryptography is
assumed. Each component’s operation can be represented
as states of a state machine, and communication among the
components can be represented as messages sent between the
components. So we model each component as a subject. Each
subject has a set of states with inputs and outputs based on
the system operation. The transitions between different states
are also defined by the architecture designs and protocols.
Among all the subjects, there is an initiator subject that
starts the system protocol/interaction and a finisher subject
that ends the protocol/interaction; they could both be the
same subject. This initiator subject has a “start” state while
the finisher subject has a “commit” state. The verification
procedure starts at the initiator’s “start” state. At each state in
each subject, it takes actions corresponding to the transition
rules. It will exhaustively explore all possible rules and states
to find all the possible paths from the initiator’s “start” state
to the finisher’s “commit” state. Then we judge if the verifi-
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cation goals are satisfied in all of these paths. The system is
verified to be secure if there are paths from initiator’s “start”
state to finisher’s “commit” state, and all the verification
goals are satisfied in any of these paths.
2.2.2 Preconditions and Security Invariants
The protocols and interactions are subject to constraints,
the so-called preconditions. Preconditions are closely related
to the trusted computing base (TCB) and often reflect which
principals need to be in the TCB. If a precondition is removed,
the protocol or interaction may no longer be verifiable. Ide-
ally, during verification of a system, the minimal number of
preconditions is determined, which can reduce the size of
the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). One key benefit of our
methodology is that it allows preconditions to be removed,
(even though initially thought to be required), as verification
passes with these preconditions removed.
Each protocol or interaction needs to satisfy certain se-
curity invariants – these invariants are only verified if for
all possible execution traces, the invariant is not found to
be violated. Thorough analysis of the protocols allow us to
define the invariants correctly. Often the invariant is the goal
of the design so correctness is clear. The security invariants
focus typically on confidentiality and integrity of sensitive
information. In the case of secure architectures, this sensitive
information typically is: code or data executed or stored on
the system, and measurements of the state of the system.
Confidentiality Validation. Each principal has access to
various values, including ones tagged as confidential to indi-
cate the need for confidentiality protection of that value. The
untrusted principal could try to combine all the information it
has obtained in all of its states to try to break confidentiality
of some of the messages (e.g. it has seen cipher text in some
state, and the decryption key in another).
For each value tagged as confidential, the invariants check
if any untrusted principal has access to it. If not, confidential-
ity of this value is maintained. Otherwise the invariants check
if the value is tagged as encrypted (i.e. it has a decryption key
associated with it) and the untrusted principal has access to
the key. If so the untrusted principal can obtain the plaintext,
thus violating confidentiality. Otherwise the confidentiality
is preserved. The above heuristics are consistent with our
assumption of strong cryptography and that the attacker is not
able to break the asymmetric or symmetric key cryptography,
unless they have access to the proper key.
Integrity Validation. The way we are able to check for in-
tegrity attacks is through comparing the values available to an
individual trusted principal to all the values in the model. The
trusted principals have only visibility into their input values
and the known-good private values they posses. Mean-
while, the model has visibility into all the inputs and outputs
from all the principals, and which other principals may have
modified these values. During a run of the model, the in-
variants check if there is enough information in the (explicit
and implicit) inputs to a trusted principal for that principal to
reject any inputs that have been compromised (e.g. fabricated
or replayed values). The key ideas behind the integrity checks
are: (1) checking for “known-good” values, which can be
referenced by a trusted party to validate some of the inputs,
these good values need to be stored securely or come from
a trusted source; (2) checking for self-consistency of values,
which allows a trusted party to check the inputs and make
sure they are mutually consistent.
2.2.3 Implementation and Results
Our security verification methodology can be realized us-
ing very different tools. Since these are existing tools, the
incremental overhead to achieve our security verification
methodology is very small. Also, designers can choose the
tools they are more familiar with, or that best suit their pur-
pose. In this paper we use two verification tools ProVerif [13]
and Murphi [15] to exemplify that this is a flexible methodol-
ogy. Proverif has built-in security invariant checking support
which Murphi does not. But Proverif is targeted at network
protocol verification, and we have to use (repurpose) it in a
clever way for checking interactions between software and
hardware modules within a system. Murphi has more com-
plete model checking facilities which enable the designer to
do functional modelling and verification with the same tool as
security verification. Murphi can be enhanced with security
checking mechanisms as we have done, to propagate security
tags for checking for integrity and confidentiality breaches.
The verification results are either 1) the protocol or inter-
action passes, or 2) there is some invariant that does not hold
and verification fails. If verification fails, the design needs
to be updated, and one has to run the verification process
again. When verification passes, some preconditions can be
removed to test if they are necessary. Once the protocol or
interaction passes with the least number of preconditions, the
verification process is completed.
In the following two sections we validate our methodology
on two types of secure architectures: a standalone server
processor (HyperWall [5, 14]). and a distributed cloud system
(CloudMonatt [12]).
3. VERIFYING A STANDALONE SERVER
In this section, we show how to use the above methodol-
ogy to verify a secure standalone server processor. We use
HyperWall [5, 14] as an example.
HyperWall is a secure processor architecture which aims
to protect virtual machines from an untrusted hypervisor,
a predecessor to AMD’s SEV extensions. The processor
hardware in HyperWall is extended with new mechanisms
for managing the memory translation and memory update so
that the hypervisor is not able to compromise confidentiality
and integrity of a virtual machine. The hardware allows the
hypervisor to manage the memory, but once the memory is
assigned to a virtual machine, the hypervisor has no access to
it. It is scrubbed by hardware before the hypervisor can gain
access again. These protections are realized in HyperWall
through extra registers and memory regions which are only
accessible to the hardware, namely the TEC (Trust Evidence
and Configuration) memory region. The TEC tables protect
the memory of the guest VMs from accesses by the hypervisor
and/or by DMA, depending on the customer’s specification.
Each memory region has an associated entry in the TEC
tables specifying the access rights.
HyperWall can be used as the cloud server in a cloud com-
puting scenario where there is a remote user communicating
to his or her (HyperWall) server located in the cloud possibly
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Figure 2: Architecture of HyperWall
managed by an untrusted cloud provider. HyperWall architec-
ture is summarized in Figure 2. Below we present verification
of one external protocol and one internal interaction of Hy-
perWall. We have further performed verification of five more
HyperWall interactions, summarized in Section 5.
3.1 External Protocol: VM Startup Validation
The security verification goal is to check if the integrity
of VM image and configurations are protected during VM
startup (system startup phase in Figure 1).
Modeling. Figure 3 shows the external protocol with the
involved components. The customer component “starts” VMs
by specifying a nonce, N, the virtual machine image I, and
the desired set of confidentiality and integrity protections
for the virtual machine, P. This “start VM" message is sent
over the network to the hypervisor, which creates a data
structure representing a VM. The network and hypervisor
are both untrusted and have the same attack capabilities;
thus we collapse them into one component for the purpose
of modeling. After the VM is prepared, the processor is
invoked to start the VM, through a VM Launch instruction.
The microprocessor hardware launches the VM. It signs –
with its secret key SKP – values that will define the VM: N,
VID (the VM identifier assigned by the processor), hash(I),
hash(P), and TE (the initial trust evidence where initially the
number of memory access violation is zero). The five values
and their signature, Sig, and a certificate from the hardware
manufacturer with the verification key needed to check the
signature, CertVKP , are sent back to the customer. CertVKP
is signed by the trusted vendor.
To aid the verification, we have added two extra states
to make explicit information available to the customer and
processor. In particular, the customer knows the certificate
for the manufacturer CertMfg and the initial expected value
of TE. The processor knows the key, SKP that it uses to make
the signatures. It also has a certificate for the corresponding
public key, VKP, for recipients to verify its signatures. This
information is made explicit as inputs from the two trusted
party states, TP1 and TP2.
Security invariants. We identify one invariant:
1 The customer is able to reach the commit state with N,
VID, hash(I), hash(P), TE, Sig and CertVKP not being
compromised by the untrusted hypervisor or the untrusted
network.
Preconditions. We make several preconditions about the
processor and cloud user and check if the above security
invariants can be satisfied with these.
(C1) The processor is trusted.
(C2) The processor has valid CertVKP and SKP.
Customer
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N
I
P
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S_PROC_VMLAUNCH
S_NWHV_RELAYS_CUST_CHECK
S_CUST_COMMIT
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I
P
N
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N
I
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Sig = sign+&' (N || VID || hash(I) || hash(P) || TE)
Figure 3: Model of VM Startup Validation external protocol. SKP is the
private key belonging to the processor, for which the customer has CertMfg
certificate from manufacturer and the CertVKP certificate of the SKP sent
by the processor, which is signed by the manufacturer.
(C3) The customer has valid CertMfg and TE.
Implementation. We model the Customer, Network, and
Processor in Murphi as a set of state machines. For this
protocol, we are concerned with the network or hypervisor
component fabricating or replaying values as it passes them to
the processor, or when it returns values back to the customer.
These two are collapsed into the single untrusted principal
with states corresponding to two points where this principal
needs to relay the data and it could be attacked.
We extend the murphi model checker tool to propagate
multiple values, for each value whose integrity must be veri-
fied: the correct value, a fabricated value and a replayed value.
At the commit state, we check if the cryptography used al-
lowed us to verify that the correct value was returned, despite
transmission through the untrusted network and hypervisor.
Results. The security verification passes for all possible runs
and the customer can reach the commit state. The integrity of
N, VID, hash(I), hash(P), TE, Sig and CertVKP is protected
against fabrication of values and replay of values.
Specifically, N and TE satisfy the case that there are known
good values to compare against for these invariants. For
CertVKP there is the CertMfg that can be used to compare
against it and verify it. VID satisfies the case that there is a
signature that includes this value and a chain of certificates
to verify the verification key of the signature. hash(I) and
hash(P) are hash primitives and included in the signature
so they cannot be forged. The integrity of Sig is checked
against fabrication: neither the network nor the hypervisor
have access to the private signing key SKP and the customer
has access to a chain of certificates that allows for him or her
to verify the signature. It is also checked against replay of
values: the customer can check the nonce, N, that he or she
generated for this run of the protocol.
3.2 Internal Interaction: VM Launch
We now show how to do the security verification of set-
ting up protections for the VM’s memory pages (protection
initialization phase in Figure 1).
Modeling. Figure 4 shows the flow chart of the VM Launch
mechanism. The mechanism is triggered when the hypervisor
tries to start a new VM, as part of the VM startup attestation
external protocol. The hypervisor sets up the VM and then
executes the vm_launch instruction. The processor captures
this instruction and atomically launches the VM with the
following five operations, highlighted in Figure 4:
(1) The processor consults the TEC tables to find a free
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Figure 4: Model of VM Launch Mechanisms. CertVKP is the certificate
of the signing key used by the processor in creating the signature Sig.
entry where the information about the VM will be stored. (2)
Once a free VM entry is found, the page tables are protected.
(3) Then the Confidentiality and Integrity Protection (CIP)
tables for the VM’s pages are protected. (4) The VM’s pages
are protected. Each memory page is protected by denying
access to the hypervisor and to DMA. (5) Finally, the hashes
of the VM image and VM protections are generated. The
page table page count is saved in the TEC table entry for the
VM, and the VM is actually launched.
Security invariants. We identify one invariant:
1 The processor needs to ensure the VM started has ex-
actly the configuration and protection requested, and that
correct hash measurements of the VM are taken.
Preconditions. We require several preconditions about the
processor, these are a subset of the preconditions needed by
the prior external protocol.
(C1) The processor is trusted.
(C2) The processor has valid CertVKP and SKP.
Implementation. As above, we model the untrusted network
and untrusted hypervisor as a single entity, with the capability
to fabricate values and replay values. The processor is trusted
based on our preconditions. We use Murphi to model the
processor as a state machine. The Processor needs to ensure
the integrity of the start up values received when a request
to launch a VM is received: N, VID, hash(I), hash(P), TE,
Sig and CertVKP . We tag these values as requiring integrity
protection and check if these values are fabricated or replayed
when the protocol reaches the commit state.
Results. This protocol focuses on integrity of the start up
values received: N, VID, hash(I), hash(P), TE, Sig and
CertVKP . The model keeps track of whether the reads or
writes to protection tables were accessed only by the trusted
hardware. Our verification results indicate that the processor
will correctly conduct the above five steps, and generate the
correct hash measurements at the commit state.
3.3 Security Discussion
Coverage. In addition to the two protocols shown above,
five other protocols or interactions were verified, as listed
in Table 1. The protocols and interactions verified cover the
execution phases from Figure 1, except for VM migration.
The methodology facilitates a “design for security” approach
where architects can validate individual protocols and inter-
actions at the design phase.
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Figure 5: Architecture of CloudMonatt.
Impact. The verification effort uncovered two flaws in the
original design [5], and later fixed in [14]. The first was a
replay attack in the VM Suspend and Resume protocol. The
original design [5] included a nonce to prevent replay attacks.
However, when modeling the internal interaction due to VM
Suspend & Resume, the verification of the model failed, point-
ing out that the “nonce” value was not updated during the
suspend and resume operation as originally assumed, thus
not providing replay protection. A related problem was dis-
covered about the trust evidence data, previously also only
stored in registers. Stale trust evidence data could have been
sent back to the customer, by a compromised hypervisor.
4. VERIFYING A DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM
CloudMonatt [12] is a flexible distributed cloud architec-
ture to monitor and attest the security health of customers’
VMs in the cloud. Figure 5 shows the architecture overview
of CloudMonatt. It involves four entities: the customer, the
Cloud Controller, the Attestation Server and the cloud server.
The Cloud Controller acts as the cloud manager, responsible
for taking VM requests and servicing them for each customer.
The Attestation Server acts as the attestation requester and
appraiser, to collect the security measurements from the VM,
interpret the measurements and make attestation decisions.
The Cloud Server has a Monitor Module which contains
different types of monitors to provide comprehensive and rich
security measurements. It has a Trust Module responsible
for server authentication, secure measurement storage and
crypto operations.
We now show how our security verification methodology
can be used to verify the main attestation protocol of Cloud-
Monatt. We also show how this methodology can help to
narrow down the number of trusted components needed in
the trusted computing base for this distributed system.
4.1 External Protocol: Cloud Attestation
Cloud attestation is the procedure of making unforgeable
claims about the security conditions of customers’ VMs based
on the evidence supplied by the host server. We verify that the
requested report is not tampered with in CloudMonatt archi-
tecture, and hence the integrity of the end-to-end attestation
is achieved (protection attestation phase in Figure 1).
Modeling. We model each entity involved in this distributed
system as an interacting state machine, as shown in Figure
6. The whole process starts from the customer, who sends to
the Cloud Controller the attestation request including the VM
identifier, VID, and the security properties, P. Then the Cloud
Controller forwards the request to the Attestation Server,
with the host servers identifier, I. The Attestation Server
sends MR, the request of necessary measurement, to the host
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Figure 6: The external protocol in CloudMonatt. SKC, SKA and ASKS are the private signing keys of the Cloud Controller, the Attestation Server and
the cloud server, respectively. KX, KY and KZ are symmetric keys between the customer and the Cloud Controller, between the Cloud Controller and the
Attestation Server, and between the Attestation Server and the cloud server, respectively.
server. The cloud server collects the required measurements
M, hashes and signs the measurements, and sends them back
to the Attestation Server. The Attestation Server checks the
received message and, if correct, generates the attestation
report R based on M and P. Then the Attestation Server signs
the report and transmits it to the Cloud Controller. The Cloud
Controller checks the message and, if correct, hashes and
signs the report, and sends it to the customer. The customer
ends the attestation session if the he finds the report is correct.
Security invariants. We identify one invariant:
1 The attestation report R the customer receives is indeed
the one for VID with P, specified by the customer.
Preconditions. Initially, we specify several preconditions
and check if the above invariant can be satisfied under these
preconditions. Later, we verify each of these preconditions.
(C1) The cloud server is trusted.
(C2) The Attestation Server is trusted.
(C3) The Cloud Controller is trusted.
Implementation. We model the external protocol in ProVerif.
Specifically, we declare each subject as a process. Each pro-
cess keeps some variables. If the subject is trusted, we denote
these variables as private, not accessible by the attacker.
Otherwise the variables are assumed public. We declare a
network connected between each pair of subjects, to repre-
sent the untrusted communication channels. These channels
are under full control of the network-level adversaries, who
can eavesdrop or modify any messages. We use the cryp-
tographic primitives from ProVerif to model the public key
infrastructure for digital certificate, authentication and key
exchange. Then we model the attestation process for an un-
bounded number of sessions, and check if the adversary can
compromise the integrity of the report in any session.
We use ProVerif’s reachability proof functionality to verify
the integrity of a message. Specifically, we define a function
R(VID, P) to denote the correct report of VM VID for prop-
erty P. At the customer’s state “S_CUST_COMMIT”, the
customer receives the report R, and we check if the statement
R = R(VID, P) is always true. We use the statement “query
event(R6=R(VID, P))" to check the negative scenario: an
integrity breach has occurred. If this query statement is false,
the attacker has no means to change the message R without
being observed by the customer and the integrity of R holds.
Results. First, ProVerif shows the security invariant 1 is sat-
isfied under the preconditions (C1) – (C3). The network-level
Network
S_NW_RELAY
Client/OS/Hypervisor
S_OSHV_RELAY
VID, MR, N3
Monitor Module
S_MON_INVOKE
Trust Module
S_TRU_STORS_MON_GETMEA
S_OSHV_RELAY
S_NW_COMMIT
Sig3
Sig3
VID, MR, N3
VID, MR, N3
VID, MR, M, N3
S_TRU_SIGN
VID, MR, M, N3
S_CLI_INVOKE
S_CLI_ENC
Cloud Server
enc! " (VID || MR || N3)
enc! " (Sig3)
Sig3 = sign#$! %(VID || MR || M || N3 || hash(VID || MR || M || N3))Figure 7: Internal interactions in the cloud server. KZ is the symmetric key
known to the Attestation Server and the cloud server. ASKS is the private
signing key of the cloud server.
adversaries cannot compromise the integrity of the messages
without being observed, as all the messages are cryptographi-
cally protected. Second, ProVerif shows that preconditions
(C1) – (C3) are necessary to keep the invariants correct, and
missing any precondition can lead to violations of the in-
variant. An untrusted cloud server can counterfeit wrong
measurements, making the customer receives wrong attesta-
tion report generated from the measurements. An untrusted
Attestation Server can generate wrong attestation report for
the customer. An untrusted Cloud Controller can modify the
attestation reports before sending to the customer.
4.2 Internal Interaction: Evidence Collection
Placing the entire server into the TCB would require stronger
security protection, which is expensive and difficult to achieve.
So, we conduct internal verification to identify the necessary
components inside the servers that need to be trusted. We
verify the evidence collection process in the cloud server
(protection attestation phase in Figure 1).
Modeling. We model the key components inside a cloud
server as state machines (Figure 7). We also include the un-
trusted network as the initiator and finisher subject in the in-
ternal protocol to interact with the server. The whole process
starts when the network passed the encrypted measurement
request to the server. The Attestation Client processes
the request and passes it to the Monitor Module. The Mon-
itor Module collects the correct measurements, and then
stores the measurements together with other related informa-
tion in the Trust Module. The Trust Module calculates
the hash and signature using its private attestation key. Then
the signature is encrypted by the Attestation Client and
sent out. The network goes to the commit state when it
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receives the encrypted measurement.
Security invariants. We identify one invariant:
1 The cloud server needs to ensure that the correct measure-
ment M are taken for VM VID with request MR.
Preconditions. We identify a set of possible preconditions.
(C1) The Monitor Module is trusted.
(C2) The Trust Module is trusted.
(C3) The channel between the Monitor Module and the
Trust Module is trusted.
Implementation. We model a software or hardware compo-
nent as a process. Each component keeps some variables and
operates as a state machine. If one component is in the TCB,
then its variables will be declared as private. Otherwise its
variables are public to attackers. If two modules are linked
by an untrusted channel, then we declare a public network
between these two components. Otherwise we combine the
two component into one process so that they can exchange
messages securely.
We also use ProVerif’s reachability proof functionality to
verify the integrity of measurement M. When the network
reaches state “S_NW_COMMIT”, we denote the measure-
ment inside the encrypted message as M. We also defines a
functionM(VID, MR), which gives the correct measurement
of VM VID for the measurement request MR. Then we check
if the statement M =M(VID, MR) is always true at the com-
mit state. We use the statement “query event(M 6=M(VID,
MR))" to discover potential integrity breach. If this statement
is false, the attacker has no means to change M without being
observed by the customer and the integrity of M holds.
Results. We verify that it is sufficient and necessary to
keep the security invariant with these preconditions, when
the network, OS and hypervisor is untrusted. Missing any
prediction can lead to invariant violation: an untrusted Moni-
tor Module can collect wrong measurements M and store
them into the Trust Module; an untrusted Trust Module
can generate a fake signature over any measurements using
the signing key ASKS; an untrusted channel between the
Monitor Module and Trust Module gives the adversary a
chance to modify the measurements without being detected.
4.3 Security Discussion
Coverage. We show the main CloudMonatt attestation pro-
tocol is secure, i.e., correct and unforgeable. We show the
evidence collection process in the cloud server is secure. We
also verified the property interpretation process in the Attes-
tation Server and the health checking process in the Cloud
Controller in the same way as we showed for the Cloud
Server. This completes the end-to-end security verification
of the protection attestation phase in CloudMonatt.
Impact. One of the most interesting results of security ver-
ification is to show how we can enhance the security of the
architecture during design. In CloudMonatt, it showed that
only the Monitor Module and Trust Module of a cloud server
should be included in the TCB. Normally, third party cus-
tomers (at guest VM privilege) has no capability to subvert
the security functions provided by these two modules (at the
hypervisor privilege). To defeat attacks (e.g., privilege esca-
lation) caused by the vulnerabilities of the original system,
Model Int. or Ext. Lines of Code Runtime (s)
VM Startup Ext. 1159 0.8s
VM Launch Int. 462 0.6s
VM Secure Channel Ext. 1332 0.3s
VM Trust Evidence Ext. 1081 0.2s
VM Suspend & Resume Ext. 1054 0.5s
VM Mem. Update Int. 687 0.7s
VM Terminate Int. 417 0.8s
Table 1: HyperWall verification evaluation results.
Model Int. or Ext. Lines of Code Runtime (s)
External Ext. 262 0.2s
Evidence Collection Int. 123 0.1s
Property Interpretation Int. 205 0.2s
Health Checking Int. 187 0.1s
Table 2: CloudMonatt verification evaluation results.
secure enclaves can be used to protect the execution environ-
ment of the Monitor Module and Trust Module, leveraging
mechanisms provided by Bastion [18].
5. VERIFICATION EVALUATION
In addition to the protocols presented in this paper, we
have also verify five more for HyperWall and two more for
CloudMonatt. For HyperWall, we use CMurphi 5.4.4 and the
models were run with options -tv -ndl -m1000. The -tv
writes a violating trace (if an invariant fails), and the -ndl
disables the checking for deadlock states. For CloudMonatt
we use ProVerif 1.88 with default options.
The collected results for HyperWall in Table 1 and for
CloudMonatt in Table 2. The verification process is iter-
ative, where the ProVerif or Murphi files may be updated
many times, thus comments are crucial to understand the
development of the verification strategy. We can also ob-
serve that the verification runtime is also very small: due to
the breakdown of internal and external verification, we can
verify complex architectures within a very short time. The
most effort-consuming step is the design and writing of the
verification models, but the actual verification is quick.
6. RELATED WORK
Secure application verification. Past work, e.g., [19, 20],
has focused on verifying software with respect to an ISA. In
contrast, we are going one layer below, focusing on the state
machines and protocols of the hardware.
Secure architecture verification. Of the different secure
architectures, XOM [21] and SecVisor [22] have received
the benefit of security verification using model-checking. In
industry, e.g., the IBM 4758 cryptographic co-processor’s
design included security verification [23]. These works, how-
ever, have not focused on external and internal protocols and
interactions as we do.
Security verification tools. A number of speciality tools
exist for security verification and verification of security
protocols. These tools include HERMES [24], Casrul [25],
AVISPA [26], Scyther [27], ProVerif [13], etc. Various model
checkers have also been used in security verification. Typical
model checkers include Maude [28], Alloy [29], Murphi [15],
CSP [30], FDR [31], etc. Our work does not invent a new tool,
rather it shows how architects can leverage existing tools. We
show that both the protocol verification tools (ProVerif) and
model checkers (Murphi) can be used by our framework to
implement the security verification task. We enhanced Mur-
phi with automatic checking for integrity and confidentiality,
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but did not need to make any changes to Proverif.
Security verification methodologies. As an alternative to
modelling, projects such as Caisson [32] or SecVerilog [33]
work directly with the hardware source code, and leverage
information flow tracking to analyze potential information
leaks in an architecture. Our work does not require hardware
source code, and can be complimentary to the approaches
that work with HDL code.
7. CONCLUSION
We present a security verification methodology, which is
applicable to different security architectures and systems. We
break the verification task into external verification and in-
ternal verification to achieve scalability of verification. For
each type of verification, we propose the methodology for
modeling the system and the attackers, deriving security in-
variants, and creating the implementation. We use two case
studies to evaluate our methodology: security verification of
a standalone processor architecture, HyperWall, and verifica-
tion of a distributed cloud system, CloudMonatt. Our case
studies show that we can verify the design of complex secure
architectures efficiently, discover and fix bugs, and enhance
the security of the design. We hope that our methodology can
be easily adopted by computer architects to verify the security
of their designs, and to do more research in the important
area of security verification methodologies.
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